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Most legitimate calls are from persons or organizations with
strong social ties such as friends. Some legitimate calls, how-
ever, are from those with weak social ties such as a restau-
rant the callee booked a table on-line. Since a callee’s con-
tact list usually contains only the addresses of persons or or-
ganizations with strong social ties, filtering out unsolicited
calls using the contact list is prone to false positives. To
reduce these false positives, we first analyzed call logs and
identified that legitimate calls are initiated from persons or
organizations with weak social ties through transactions over
the web or email exchanges. This paper proposes two ap-
proaches to label incoming calls by using cross-media rela-
tions to the previous contact mechanisms which initiate the
calls. One approach is that potential callers offer the callee
their contact addresses which might be used in future corre-
spondence. Another is that a callee provides potential callers
with weakly-secret information that the callers should use in
future correspondence in order to identify them as someone
the callee has contacted before through other means. De-
pending on the previous contact mechanisms, the callers use
either customized contact addresses or message identifiers.
The latter approach enables a callee to label incoming calls
even without caller identifiers. Reducing false positives dur-
ing filtering using our proposed approaches will contribute
to the reduction in SPIT (SPam over Internet Telephony).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Unsolicited calls usually originate from unknown persons or
organizations, whom the callee has not been informed of
their contact addresses nor met before. Since an IP-based
infrastructure is more vulnerable to unsolicited calls, as de-
scribed in [1], people have recently been experiencing more
SPIT calls. Most legitimate calls, by contrast, have caller
Figure 1: Existing SPIT Filter
identifiers (IDs) that the callee has seen before. Some legit-
imate calls, however, have unknown caller IDs. Examples of
these legitimate calls include confirmations of reservations
or deliveries, and recorded notifications of school closing on
a snowy day. These legitimate calls are often labeled as un-
solicited calls at a typical SPIT filtering system illustrated
in Figure 1 since their caller IDs are not found on the callee’s
white list. This is called as the “introduction problem.” Due
to this introduction problem, some systems forward these
calls to a voice mail box, rather than reject them.
Generally, the callee’s white list or accept-list contains the
same addresses with his contact list or address book, which
is populated by contact addresses of people with strong ties
in his social network [2] such as family members and friends.
For business use, the accept-list usually links to a directory
service located on an LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol) [3] server. For either use, however, the accept-list
does not usually include the addresses of persons or organi-
zations with weak ties [2] such as friends of a friend in an SNS
(Social Network Service) over the web. On the other hand,
a black list or reject-list contains the contact addresses of
undesired callers or links to a reputation server that gathers
IDs of well-known malicious callers.
Using a white list or a black list to label incoming calls re-
quires caller ID authentication. For a VoIP (Voice over IP)
call using the SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [4], the SIP
Identity header [5] enables a callee to authenticate the caller
ID. However, some legitimate calls are sent with “unavail-
able” caller IDs, because the authentication of the caller IDs
fails, as illustrated in Figure 1. For example, most interna-
tional calls or calls through a VoIP - PSTN (Public Switched
Telephone Network) gateway have no authenticated caller
ID. These anonymous calls limit the effectiveness of labeling
incoming calls based on the caller ID.
In the next section, we analyze how legitimate calls from
people with weak ties are initiated. We then propose two
mechanisms to label incoming calls by using cross-media re-
lations between calls and the previous contacts. Our first
mechanism is that potential callers offer the callee their
contact addresses which might be used in future correspon-
dence. If the callee agrees, these contact addresses are added
to his white list. We describe this mechanism further in
Section 3.1. Our second mechanism is that a callee pro-
vides potential callers with weakly-secret information that
the callers should use in future correspondence in order to
identify them as someone the callee has contacted before
through other means. Depending on the previous contact
mechanisms, the callers use either customized contact ad-
dresses or message identifiers, as outlined in Section 3.2.
Section 4 describes a use case integrated with an SNS, and
Section 5 describes implementation details to achieve these
mechanisms. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with the
effects of our proposed mechanisms.
2. LEGITIMATECALLS FROMWEAKTIES
Our quick survey gives a rough sense of how often people
are experiencing unsolicited calls, how well-maintained con-
tact lists are effective in labeling legitimate calls, and how
legitimate calls from weak ties are initiated. In this survey,
we gathered call records of 246 calls from eight cell phones
and 136 calls from four landline phones from our colleagues
at our lab. We also asked the participants about their rela-
tionship to legitimate callers whose IDs were not found on
their contact lists.
First, Figure 2 indicates a significant difference in the pro-
portions of unsolicited calls between cell and landline phones.
Whereas only six percent of the incoming calls on cell phones
are unsolicited calls, 52 percent of those on landline phones
are unsolicited. We suspect that this difference is caused
by the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) regulations that
prohibit telemarketing calls to cell phones [6], as well as the
higher usage cost on cell phones than on landline phones.
Even though we can reduce unsolicited telemarketing calls
using the national “Do Not Call Registry” service, the effect
is unfortunately limited. The jurisdiction is only for domes-
tic telemarketers, not for international ones nor for calls over
IP infrastructure. Thus, we need a technical mechanism to
help a callee decide whether to accept incoming calls.
Second, another difference in Figure 2 is found in the pro-
portions of legitimate calls with known caller IDs. A larger
proportion, 78 percent, of the calls to cell phones carries
known caller IDs, which are found on the contact list, than
18 percent to landline phones. Since people usually main-
tain their contact lists on cell phones better than landlines,
the result shows how well-maintained contact lists are useful
to label incoming calls.
Third, Figure 2 also indicates that 17 or 29 percent of the
incoming calls are legitimate, but with unknown or unavail-
Figure 2: Incoming Calls: Cell Phones vs. Landline
Phones
able caller IDs. By asking the participants, we found that
all these legitimate calls with unknown caller IDs were ini-
tiated from transactions over the web or email exchanges.
For example, they are confirmation calls from the restau-
rants which the callee made on-line reservation, or notifi-
cation calls of flight changes from the airline on which the
callee booked flights. On the other hand, the legitimate calls
with no caller IDs were international calls or calls through
VoIP-PSTN gateways from people with strong ties. There
were no unsolicited calls from legitimate callers whom the
callee has had no prior contact with. Even if we had larger
number of the data set, most legitimate calls from people
with weak ties would still have the previous contacts with
the callees. This suggests that we need a new mechanism
to label incoming calls beyond using caller IDs, and the so-
lution could be use a piece of information related to the
previous contacts.
From these three indications, therefore, we set our goal to
enhance a SPIT filtering system covering calls from people
with weak ties. we approach it to use caller IDs and other
information related to the previous contacts between the
callee and the caller.
3. USING CROSS-MEDIA RELATIONS
Legitimate calls from persons or organizations with weak
ties, as analyzed in Section 2, are usually initiated from
the previous contacts between the callee and caller through
transactions over the web or email exchanges. Focusing on
these previous contacts, we propose that both parties ex-
change an additional information which should be used in
future correspondence as an indication that the callee has
contacted before. We call this piece of information a “cross-
media relation.” Our approach is to expand filter conditions
for incoming calls by using the cross-media relations as il-
lustrated in Figure 3, which is also applicable to other real-
time communication requests. We distinguish two types of
the cross-media relations: contact addresses offered by po-
tential callers and weakly-secret information provided by a
callee. The following outlines the mechanisms using each
type of the cross-media relations and shows our proposed
filtering system.
Figure 3: Overview of Proposed Mechanisms
3.1 Contact Addresses of Potential Callers
In general, the more contact addresses we can obtain from
potential callers, the more incoming calls we can label, since
a typical filter system uses the caller IDs as shown in Fig-
ure 1. Thus, persons or organizations that a callee contacts
through the web transactions or emails offer their contact
addresses which they might use in future correspondence
with the callee.
Depending on the contact mechanism, callers use a different
method to convey their contact addresses. In a web transac-
tion, i.e., HTTP transaction shown in Figure 4, the contact
address is conveyed in a new HTTP header, Correspondence-
URIs [7] or an HTML META tag, HTTP-EQUIV [8] in the
response from the potential caller, e.g., book.airline.com.
In an email exchange shown in Figure 5, the contact address
is contained in a vCard [9] attached to an email message sent
from the potential caller. After the callee receives the con-
tact addresses of potential callers, he adds them to his white
list only if he agrees.
The format of the contact address is either raw or hashed.
Hashed contact addresses are suitable if the potential caller
prefers concealing his routable address for privacy or oper-
ating reasons. For example, in an SNS, when a subscriber
prefers not publishing his routable contact address, he can
instead publish his hashed contact address for the limited
purpose of filtering calls.
The mechanism to use this type of cross-media relations is
appropriate in a case where the previous contact was one-
to-one correspondence between the callee and the potential
caller There are, however, several cases where we cannot ap-
ply this mechanism. In these cases, the callee should deliver
weakly-secret information to potential callers.
3.2 Weakly-Secret Information
We propose another type of the cross-media relations: weakly-
secret information provided by a callee. Potential callers
should use this information in future correspondence to be
identified as someone with whom the callee has contacted
before through other means. This mechanism is useful in
the following cases. One is where the previous contact was
one-to-many correspondence between the callee and the po-
tential callers, such as joining an association, the callee is
unwilling to receive many contact addresses of the potential
Figure 4: HTTP Message Exchanges where a Po-
tential Caller Delivers His Contact Addresses
Figure 5: Email Message Exchanges where a Poten-
tial Caller Delivers His Contact Addresses
callers. Another case is where potential callers might use a
different or no authenticated caller ID, due to the type of
communication medium or service such as two stage dialing.
Depending on the communication medium of the previous
contact, a callee provides potential callers with either cus-
tomized contact address or message identifier. The cus-
tomized contact address contains a random component or
a token. This mechanism works when a callee fills out con-
tact information on a web site, as shown in Figure 6, or in
a vCard attached to an email message. The random com-
ponent or token can be automatically generated in corre-
spondence to the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) [10], or
manually specified. In the examples in Figure 6, a token,
coms4001, in SIP-URI is set between the user name and
the domain name preceded with +, in the same way as the
email addressing practice called as“sub-addressing”[11]. For
TEL-URI [12], a token, 0012, follows the E.164 number like
an extension. To convey this information in a later call,
the caller just needs to set the destination address to the
customized contact address.
Specifically in email exchanges, as shown in Figure 7, a po-
tential caller first sends a message asking a real-time commu-
nication to the callee. Only if the callee accepts the request,
he will respond to it by email telling his contact address. As
a result, the message identifier of the response email, which
is set in the Message-ID [13] header, can be used as weakly-
secret information to prove the acceptance from the callee.
Thus, the message identifiers of outbound emails or SIP calls
can be included by the potential caller in a later call, even
if he uses a different caller ID or type of communication
medium.
To convey the message identifier in a SIP call, the caller
Figure 6: HTTP Message Exchanges where a Callee
Delivers Weakly-Secret Information
Figure 7: Email Message Exchanges where a Callee
Delivers Weakly-Secret Information
should set its value of a SIP header extension, either Refer-
To [14] or References [15]. Unfortunately, however, we need
to modify the applicable SIP methods for the Refer-to header
or define a new parameter of the References header. This is
because the Refer-To header can contain any URI, but can-
not appear except in a REFER method. On the other hand,
although the References header can appear in an INVITE
method, this header limits the parameter to call identifiers.
Since the specification of the References header is still under
discussion, we assume that the References header is used for
this purpose.
For message exchange security, we should use an appropriate
security mechanism for each communication protocol. That
is, in web transactions, we use secure HTTP (HTTPS) [16]
mechanism for message confidentiality, its integrity, and the
authentication of the web server. For email security, we
use TLS (Transport Layer Security) [17] for all the hops
from a client to the other. We also leverage anti-spam email
mechanisms when receiving emails.
3.3 Proposed Filtering Process
Figure 8 depicts a new filtering process for incoming calls,
modifying and adding conditionals using the cross-media re-
lations. If the caller ID of the incoming call is not found on
a black list, then the process looks up on a white list. The
white list contains contact addresses either in the raw or
hashed format. In addition, especially for business use, the
white list links to a remote server which securely maintains
the list of contact addresses of all members in an organiza-
tion and gives binary responses to query whether or not a
contact address is found on the list.
If the caller ID of the incoming call is not found on the white
list, the new filtering process tests on two new conditionals.
Figure 8: SPIT Filter Using Cross-Media Relations
The first one is whether it contains a valid Message-ID value
in the References header. The second is whether it contains a
valid token in the destination address, i.e., in the To header.
The validity can be determined by looking up on the filter
conditions of message identifiers and tokens. If the test suc-
ceeds on either conditional, the call request can be accepted.
4. A USE CASE: INTEGRATIONWITH AN
SNS
We describe how we can apply our proposed mechanisms
in an SNS, since an SNS is the most popular and effective
service for subscribers to maintain relationships with both
strong and weak ties and to initiate real-time communica-
tions with each other. There are three typical services in an
SNS: the subscription, the invitation of new friends to ex-
pand their own social network, the notification of the state
updates of their friends, and email exchanges among them.
The following describes how subscribers can extract cross-
media relations in each service.
A newcomer starts to subscribe to an SNS through a transac-
tion over the web although the invitation to the subscription
may be sent by email. In this web transaction, the newcomer
fills in a sign-up form including his name and contact ad-
dresses by email and/or phone. By submitting the sign-up
form, he can send a token in his customized phone contact
address. Then, he can save the token corresponding to the
URL of the web site as a filter condition. When he receives
an incoming communication request destined for his contact
address with the token, he can identify the caller as one of
the subscribers in the SNS and decide whether to accept the
request.
Next, a subscriber can expand his social network in the SNS
by inviting his friends to add to his network or being invited
by his friends to be added in her network. Such an invitation
is generally delivered by email asking the invitee to respond
at the SNS web site. If the invitee accepts the invitation, he
can receive his friend contact address in the HTTP response.
The format of the contact address, in raw or hashed, depends
on the preference of the owner of the contact address. By
adding the contact address to his white list, the invitee can
prepare to label calls or text messages from the friend.
When notifying the status updates of a subscriber’s social
network, the notification message can contain the list of
hashed contact addresses of the friends of his friend. Gen-
erally, users prefer concealing their own contact addresses
from friends in the second degree. Thus, the hashed format
of their contact addresses, rather than the raw format, is
appropriate.
Among the members in his social network, a subscriber often
exchanges emails through the SNS server. When he wants
to talk with a girl of his friend, but does not know her con-
tact address, he needs to send an email asking her contact
address for a real-time communication. If he can receive an
email response telling the acceptance and her contact ad-
dress, he can send a call request with the Message-ID of the
email response. Therefore, she can identify him as a person
corresponding to the previous email. Reversely, if he is asked
and accepts her request, he needs to save the Message-ID of
the email response in order to label a later call from her.
Thus, in these services in an SNS, a subscriber can ex-
tract cross-media relations, prepare to label incoming calls
or other real-time communication requests, and identify the
caller or requester as a specific subscriber or one of the sub-
scribers.
5. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We assume that our proposal has minimal impacts on a SIP
proxy server. The following are required implementation for
a SIP proxy server, a caller and a callee. For each end,
we describe what kind of functions our proposed mecha-
nisms require to implement in a SIP User Agent (UA), a
web browser, and an email client.
5.1 Implementation for a SIP Proxy Server
A SIP proxy server needs to forward the SIP References
header. Specifically, an inbound SIP proxy server needs to
allow the sub-addressing in the destination address in the To
header and Request-URI. When the server determines the
destination user name, the server just needs to ignore the
string after the plus separator.
5.2 Implementation for a Callee
A SIP UAS (User Agent Server) working with a filtering
system for incoming requests needs to add filter conditions
depending on the values of three SIP headers: From, To,
and References. The filter conditions consist of the origina-
tor address in the addr-spec parameter of the From header,
the destination address in the addr-spec parameter in the To
headers, and the referred message identifier in the refer pa-
rameter of the References header. With regard to originator
addresses, the stored conditions are in either raw or hashed
format. The hash algorithm for each address is also stored
as part of the filter conditions. These filter conditions are
to be stored as a user configuration at a local terminal or a
remote server such as a SIP inbound proxy server. Specifi-
cally for originator addresses belonging to an organization,
the filtering system links to a directory service using LDAP.
Therefore, the filtering system can decide whether to accept
incoming requests based on these filter conditions. If ac-
cepted, the SIP UAS should inform the user of the matched
information in order to ask the user’s final decision whether
to accept it.
In a web browser, a plug-in program should support follow-
ing functions: generating and storing a token when a user is
filling in a sign-up form, and extracting and storing contact
addresses in the HTTP response over TLS. After generat-
ing a token, if the user agrees, the plug-in program stores
the token corresponding to the timestamp of the generation
and the URL to which the sign-up form sent in an HTTP
request. After extracting contact addresses in the HTTP
response over TLS, if the user agrees, the plug-in program
adds their contact addresses to his white list. Each con-
tact address should also be stored with the hash algorithm
if the address is in the hashed format, the timestamp of the
response received, and the URL from which the response
came.
Regarding to an email client, an IMAP (Internet Message
Access Protocol) [18] client should be dedicated to our pro-
posed mechanisms. This is because the required functions
are executable without any user interaction, as long as the
client can fetch saved outgoing and incoming legitimate emails.
This IMAP client should support following functions: ex-
tracting and storing contact addresses in a vCard from in-
coming email messages and extracting and storing the mes-
sage identifiers in the Message-ID headers from outgoing
emails. These two extracting functions run periodically, but
the extracted information does not always need to synchro-
nize with saved outgoing emails. After a user deleted an
outgoing email, the corresponding message identifier may
remain for be looked up by a filtering system for a certain
period of time. The message identifier should be stored as
the filter conditions, corresponding with the timestamp of
the email sent and the destination address in the To header.
5.3 Implementation for a Caller
A SIP UAC (User Agent Client) should support the Refer-
ences header extension to convey the referred message iden-
tifier in an outgoing request. To set the message identifier,
a caller can manually copy from the Message-ID header at
any email client and paste it at a SIP UAC.
A web server should respond to an accepted sign-up form
with the contact address which will be used in future corre-
spondence. The contact address should be set in an HTTP
header extension or HTML META tag.
On the other hand, an email client does not need any addi-
tional functions for a caller since attaching vCards has been
widely deployed.
6. CONCLUSIONS
To label incoming calls, we proposed to use cross-media rela-
tions between the calls and previous contacts through trans-
actions over the web or through email exchanges. These
cross-media relations are expressed in two types of infor-
mation. First, relations can be as potential callers’ contact
addresses in either raw or hashed format, and second, they
can be expressed as weakly-secret information in the callee’s
customized contact address or the message identifier of the
callee’s outgoing email. By enhancing existing filter con-
ditions, our proposed mechanisms enable a callee to label
incoming requests, not only from persons or organizations
with weak ties, but also from those with different or no caller
IDs. As a result, we expect to avoid most of the false pos-
itives that occur during filtering, quantities in our survey
representing 17 percent of the incoming calls for cell phones
and 29 percent of the incoming calls for landlines.
In addition to the effect of reducing false positives, we expect
to observe two secondary effects from the enhancing filter-
ing. One of these secondary effects is the ability to trace
after delivery the customized contact address including the
weakly-secret information. The weakly-secret information
will identify the person who sold the contact address when
the caller sells the contact address of a callee to a third party.
Another secondary effect of our proposed filtering system is
increased security as a result of maintaining hashed contact
addresses as a filter condition, rather than gathering contact
addresses in a raw format. By collecting hashed data, our
system protects against viruses which spread using gathered
routable addresses as target addresses.
The work described in this paper is the first step in ongo-
ing efforts to integrate anti-SPIT calls work with anti-spam
email one. We are currently working on implementing our
proposed mechanisms to examine their effectiveness and us-
ability for filtering incoming calls.
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